Introduction
Fear of crime surveyors commonly include in their questionnaires a set of questions that ask respondents how likely each thinks it is that they will become a victim of one or other named crimes in the subsequent year. What is perhaps most striking about typical resulting data is that, whilst wholly unequipped with the information necessary to make a rational calculation, almost all respondents are prepared to proffer answers. Also typically, very many more people predict that they will become victims than, it is assumed, actually become victimised. What follows tests this assumption.
Method

Sample
Data are from all three waves of the Community Living and Integration Survey, conducted by the ANSA McAL Psychological Research Centre, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, which piloted in early 1999 (see Chadee & Ditton, 1999) . The first full wave was conducted in September 1999 (n=728), the second in September 2000 (n=636), and the third in September 2001 (n=716). The sampling frame was a multi-stage cluster design. Within each household, the self-declared head of the household (or the next responsible adult aged at least 18 years) was chosen as the respondent.
The initial achieved sample was representative of the Trinidadian population, specifically for age, geographical location and occupation. Double re-contact success was with 330 respondents who were surveyed in all three waves and who provide the data used here. Of these, 142 (40%) were male and 198 (60%) were female. Further, 98 (30%) were Afro-Trinidadian, 174 (53%) were Indo-Trinidadian, 55 (17%) were mixed Afro-Indo, with the remaining 3 (1%) being white. Respondent age ranged from 18-86 (mean = 47, median = 45, and mode = 39).
Measures
The questions used to measure likelihood of becoming a victim of particular crimes were the now standard specifics (adopted from Ferraro & LaGrange, 1992 Respondents were offered the following response options: "very likely", "likely", "unlikely" or "very unlikely". Each was also allowed to specify up to three crimes they had been a victim of in the year prior to interview. These questions were asked of all respondents at each of the three waves.
Results
To clarify the interpretations that follow, it should be recalled that wave 1 interviews took place at the end of year one; wave 2 interviews took place at the end of year two; and wave 3 interviews took place at the end of year three. The resulting data may be considered in two related ways.
(i) Data relating to years two, three and four
How does past experience of victimisation affect prediction of future victimisation? At an initial simple level (and using data from question 79: "How likely do you think it is that being a victim of crime in the near future will happen to you in the next year?") we can compare R's estimations of future likelihood of victimisation with actual retrospectively recalled victimisation at two points.
First, what each thought would happen in year two when being interviewed at wave 1 (risk in year two) with what they said had actually happened during year two when interviewed at wave 2 (reality in year two). Of the 295 (of a 330-strong panel) who answered risk in year two and reality in year two questions, 175 (59%) thought they would be a victim in the following year (year two) when asked to speculate at wave 1, but only 40 (14%) confessed to having actually been victims during year two when interviewed at wave 2. This is an overestimation by a factor of 4.4. In fact, of the 40 that became victims, only 29 (10%) had predicted victimisation (the other 11 had thought it unlikely), so the true overestimation factor is 6.0.
Second, what each thought would happen in year three when being interviewed at wave 2 (risk in year three) with what they said had actually happened during that year when interviewed at wave 3 (reality in year three). Of the 298 (of the 330-strong panel) who answered risk in year three and reality in year three questions, 186 (62%) thought they would be a victim in the following year when asked to speculate at wave 2, but only 23 (8%) confessed to having actually been victims when interviewed at wave 3. This is an overestimation by a factor of 8.1. In fact, of the 23 that became victims, only 18 (6%) had predicted victimisation (the other 5 had thought it unlikely), so the true overestimation factor is 10.3.
In a slightly more complicated way, we can assess how this simply demonstrated lamentable failure (for many) to become a victim affects their subsequent predictions of victimisation risk in the future?
So, third, we can look at how each rated their future one year victimisation risk during year two at wave 1, whether or not, at wave 2, they had become a victim in year two, and then at how they rated their future one year victimisation risk during year three when interviewed at wave 2. Some 277 (of the 330-strong panel) provide the data. Of the 27 who had thought it would be likely that they would be victims during year two and indeed had been victims during that year, 19 (70%) thought they would be victims in year three. Of the 9 who had thought it would be unlikely that they would be victims during year two but had been victims during that year, 5 (56%) thought they would be victims in year three. Of the 142 who had thought it would be likely that they would be victims in year two but had not been victims during that year, 112 (79%) thought they would be victims in year three. Finally, of the 99 who had thought it would be unlikely that they would be victims during year two and had not been victims during that year, 39 (39%) thought they would be victims in year three.
And, fourth, we can look at how each rated their future one year victimisation risk during year three at wave 2, whether or not, at wave 3, they had become a victim in year three, and then at how they rated their future one year victimisation risk during year four when interviewed at wave 3. Some 276 (of the 330-strong panel) provide the data. Of the 17 who had thought it would be likely that they would be victims during year three and indeed had been victims during that year, 12 (71%) thought they would be victims in year four. Of the 4 who had thought it would be unlikely that they would be victims during year three but had been victims during that year, 1 (25%) thought they would be victims in year four. Of the 157 who had thought it would be likely that they would be victims in year three but had not been victims during that year, 92 (59%) thought they would be victims in year four. Finally, of the 98 who had thought it would be unlikely that they would be victims during year three and had not been victims during that year, 42 (43%) thought they would be victims in year four.
For the third calculation, there are four outcomes. They are:
1. Year two: victimisation predicted and happened. 2. Year two: victimisation predicted but didn't happen. 3. Year two: victimisation not predicted but happened. 4. Year two: victimisation not predicted and didn't happen.
For the fourth calculation, there are also four outcomes. They are:
5. Year three: victimisation predicted and happened. 6. Year three: victimisation predicted but didn't happen. 7. Year three: victimisation not predicted but happened. 8. Year three: victimisation not predicted and didn't happen.
These two 4-value variables can be combined into one 16-value variable. Resulting data is in Table 1. __________________________ Table 1 about here __________________________ What may be deduced from this? A few types (those in rows 1, 4, 13, 16) were correct with both predictions, but they only amounted to 70 R (some 25% of the 277 strong panel). The biggest group by far were those who thought victimisation unlikely on both occasions, and were correct. The largest number of types (2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15) got it right half the time. This was true for 101 R (37%) of the panel. Finally 106 R (38%) got it wrong on both occasions (types 6, 7, 10, 11), with by far the largest single type (6) predicting victimisation on both occasions, but suffering it on neither.
Another way of looking at it is to consider the degree to which the second prediction (whether it turned out to be accurate or not) was based on the outcome of the first prediction (whether or not that was accurate). In other words, "successes" here would be those types that predicted victimisation in year three because they had been victimised in year two prior to making the prediction at wave 2; or those types that predicted non-victimisation in year three because they had not been victimised in year two prior to making the prediction at wave 2 (types 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16).
And "failures" would be those types that predicted victimisation in year three although they had not been victimised in year two prior to making the prediction at wave 2; or those types that predicted non-victimisation in year three although they had been victimised in year two prior to making the prediction at wave 2 (types 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14) .
"Successes" amounted to 114 R (41%), and "failures" 163 R (59%). Two things stand out: one, respondents are more likely to be wrong than right in predicting their victimisation risk; and two, they are far more likely (when wrong) to imagine that they will be victims when they won't, than imagine that they won't be victims when they will.
(ii) Data relating to years one, two and three
This section compares R's estimations of likelihood of victimisation with actual victimisation at three points. One, what they thought would happen in year two after being interviewed at wave 1, with what they said had actually happened in year one (the year prior to wave 1 interview). Two, what they thought would happen in year three after being interviewed at wave 2, with what they said had actually happened in year two (the year prior to wave 2 interview). Three, what they thought would happen in year four after being interviewed at wave 3, with what they said had actually happened in year three (the year prior to wave 3 interview).
At each wave, four types of R are possible. These are as listed in Table 2 . This classifies respondents into one of four types: "realists" (who have had past victim experience, and expect victim experience in the future); "pessimists" (who haven't had past victim experience, but expect victim experience in the future); "optimists" (who have had past victim experience, but don't expect victim experience in the future); and "idealists" (who haven't had past victim experience, and don't expect victim experience in the future). __________________________ Table 2 about here __________________________ At each wave, about half are "pessimists"; about a third are "idealists", but only a handful either "realist" or "optimists". "Realists" and "optimists" are inevitably few in number as the total in these two categories together cannot exceed the small number of actual victims. Generally speaking, people are more likely to be negative (not expecting future victimisation) than positive (expecting future victimisation). In wave 1, 59% were negative; in wave 2, 62%; and in wave 3, 54%. In wave 1, 72% of victims and 58% of non-victims were negative about the future; in wave 2, 68% of victims and 62% of non-victims were negative about the future; and in wave 3, 72% of victims and 58% of non-victims were negative about the future. Table 3 gives the percentages of each type at waves 1, 2 and 3.
__________________________ Table 3 about here __________________________
A first and obvious point is that there isn't much sample variance across the three waves (if we imagine them to be three separate samples) with, for example, Pessimists constituting 51%, 54% and 49% of the sample on the three occasions. However, there is a great deal of individual variance, or the sort that mirrors the levels of individual variance in expressed levels of fear detailed in Table 3 of Ditton, et al., 2005 . Individual risk variance is detailed in Table 4 . __________________________ Table 4 about here __________________________ We know from Table 4 that only 45% were consistent to the expecting future victimisation question across the three waves, with thus a majority changing their minds wave to wave (14% a single early change, 26% a single late change, and 16% a double change). A surprisingly large number are pessimistic, with 50 (20%) being so at all three waves, an additional 58 (23%) pessimistic at two waves, and a further 63 (25%) at one of the 3 waves. Thus over two thirds of the sample (68%) is pessimistic at least once.
An alternative way of looking at this data is to define the Realists and Idealists as being right (at least their predictions are in line with their past experiences) and the Pessimists and Optimists are wrong. In this sense, 54% were wrong at wave 1, 58% at wave 2 and 52% at wave 3. Overall, only 38 (15%) were right on all three occasions, 66 (26%) on two occasions, and 96 (38%) on one of them.
(iii) Summary
Part (ii) focussed on the issue of how past prediction related to future experience. Only a quarter of the sample predicted successfully on the two occasions where this could be assessed. Overall, respondents were more likely to be wrong than right when predicting their future victimisation risk, and when wrong, were more likely to imaging that they would be victims when they weren't than to imagine that they would not be victims when they were. Part (ii) was an attempt to see how past experience affects future prediction, and the relationship can be assessed on three occasions. Insofar as future victimisation risk estimation is based on past year actual victimisation, respondents were again more likely to be wrong than right, and again more likely to predict future victimisation on the basis of past non-victimisation than to predict future non-victimisation on the basis of past victimisation.
Discussion
These data lend empirical support to the assumption that people typically predict more victimisation than they eventually suffer. It is unclear why this should be so. Leaving aside for the moment the issue of respondent preparedness to answer questions when they do not possess the information necessary to do so, why are most respondents so gloomy?
An obvious candidate explanation for overestimation of victimisation likelihood is malign media influence. However, there certainly isn't a consistent set of findings indicating that, whatever their media consumption, people are uniformly and hugely misinformed about crime. Although it can be demonstrated that media coverage of crime is both selective and distorted (Ditton & Duffy, 1983) it cannot be assumed that people's beliefs must be skewed in the same way.
Indeed, in a series of studies, Tyler has shown that while people may base their estimations of their personal risk of victimisation on their own experiences and what they perceive to be those of friends and neighbours, they tend not to rely on media accounts as the latter are typically insufficiently informative, memorable or upsetting. Separate from judgements of personal victimisation risk are general concerns about crime, and the latter are demonstrably influenced by media accounts (Tyler, 1980 (Tyler, , 1984 Tyler & Cook, 1984; Tyler & Rasinski, 1984) .
In considering the evidence, there are actually three dimensions of relevance. One, whether it is people's belief in crime generally or in specific offences. Two, whether it is belief in the relative frequency of separate crimes, or in the degree and direction of change in rates of victimisation. Three, whether beliefs refer to the local, regional or national level. Available data doesn't always separate these dimensions. But the evidence that exists does permit some reliable statements to be made.
First, there is no match typically between people's belief in the direction of regional (Davis, 1952) or national (Hough & Roberts, 1998) change in crime, and changes in crime as measured by officially recorded crime rates, or by national victim surveys.
Usually, people believe that crime is increasing a great deal, when it is only increasing slowly, or even declining.
Second, people seem to be better at estimating the degree and direction of change in rates of crime as the area in question gets closer and closer to their own neighbourhood. People generally believe that crime is rising very fast in the nation as a whole, somewhat less rapidly in their own city than in the rest of the country, but is not rising very rapidly at all in their own neighbourhood (Brantingham, et al., 1986) . A slightly less sophisticated but otherwise similar notion was suggested by Furstenberg (1971) , who shows that for Baltimore respondents, 89% thought that crime had gone up in the past year in the US as a whole, 80% thought it had in Baltimore, but only 39% thought it had in their own neighbourhood.
Third, people seem rather good specifying the relative frequency of occurrence of crime types, and characteristics of offenders locally (Roshier, 1973) . People tend to overestimate the frequency of the least frequent offences, and underestimate the frequency of the most frequent ones, but this specific finding reflects a discovered general tendency to do that in other studies of judgemental processes (Warr, 1980 (Warr, , 1982 . Fourth, people can be quite good at estimating the actual national frequency of serious crimes like murder (Hough & Roberts, 1998) . Fifth, given the well-known inadequacies of criminal statistics, it is possible that public beliefs are more accurate than police recorded rates. McPherson (1978) suggests this for vandalism, and Warr (1982) for adultery and homosexuality.
Conclusion
There is more than one way of conceiving of "risk". The simplest is merely to conceptualise it as the probability of an event occurring in a specified time period, although, as Adams (1995: 4) reminds us, "ordinary people managing the risks in their lives, rarely resort to precise quantification". Risk is rather more frequently conceptualised as a more complicated yet less precisely specified combination of the probability of an event occurring coupled to the magnitude of the impact it might have should it occur (Adams, 1995: 69; Slovic, 2000: 195, 232) . Since neither element is simple to compute, and nor is the multiplied function of the two easy to conceptualise, "people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgemental operations" (Kahneman, et al., 1982: 3) . 4 4 The first author was responsible for conducting qualitative interviews with a sample of respondents from Glasgow who were asked to explain their previously given self-ratings of burglary victimisation risk. Two heuristic devices were obviously in play. First the gambler's fallacy (Dewdney, 1993: 62 -"the longer you wait for a certain random event, the more likely it becomes"). As one unburgled respondent put it, "I suppose as time goes on there's more chance of it happening because it hasn't happened in the past, you know, on a statistical basis." Statements like that were common. An inference would be that respondents could relax after being burgled. Not so, and secondly, a burgled respondent, "I think there is a statistic that says if you are broken into you are liable to be broken into within a year of that date." The unconscious use of these two mutually contradictory heuristics might account for the general gloominess of most lay predictions in this field.
It seems plausible -and future research might well seek to test this -that lay predictions in the field of criminal victimisation are better explained by examining the nature of and frequency of use of the various "heuristics" that are known, in other fields of inquiry, to form the bases of judgmental processes evoked by those without a competent grasp of probability theory or access to the complexity of information that use of such theories demands as a precursor. This paper has offered what seems to be the first limited proof of the idea that people tend to overestimate their "risk" of future criminal victimisation, even after serially possessing the very information (their own prior victimisation record) that would allow them to predict it with less exaggeration. This leaves open for future examination, the reasons why they do so. Thus, judgemental processes, not probabilistic assessments, will yield the richest fruit -albeit from the highest analytic branches. 
